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PROJECTIONS OF FLIGHT CREW
EMPLOYMENT BY U.S. SCHEDULED
AIRLINES, 1961 AND 19651
By STEPHEN P. SOBOTKA*
Research Associate (Associate Professor) Graduate School of Business of
the University of Chicago
and
MARGARET WIESENFELDER
Research Economist, The Transportation Center at Northwestern University
T HIS paper represents a sequel to or, more accurately, a revision of an
article published in this Journal in the winter of 1958.2 The projections
are now extended from 1960 to 1965 and take into account the plans for
manning jet aircraft which have evolved since the earlier article appeared.
Also since that time, the staff of the Transportation Center has developed
a more systematic technique for estimation of the probable future size and
composition of the airline fleet than previously available.3 This technique,
described briefly below, for the purpose of this article has been applied to
the U.S. domestic and international scheduled airline fleets. 4 The resulting
fleet composition and fleet employment estimate, along with flight crew
complement decisions arising out of more recently negotiated labor con-
tracts, form the basis of the flight personnel employment projections pre-
sented in this article.
Altogether, well over 400 turbojet and turboprop aircraft have been
ordered by United States airlines for delivery by the end of 1961. These
range in size from large intercontinental 4-engine Boeing or Douglas air-
liners to relatively small twin-engine turboprop aircraft such as the Fair-
child F-27. A typical large "jet" is capable of producing about three times
the number of seat miles, for every hour of use, of the previously most
productive piston-powered aircraft.5 Consequently, as the new, more "pro-
ductive" aircraft are integrated into airline operations, the number of
seat-miles (or passenger miles) produced per "pilot hour" will rise rapidly.
With the same number of pilots employed to fly a plane, therefore, the
number of "pilot hours" required per passenger mile will drop drastically
for the primarily jet-powered fleet.
'i Currently on leave of absence as assistant director of research for the
Transportation Center at Northwestern University.1 Flight personnel or flight crew is taken to mean cockpit crew, including
pilots, copilots, flight engineers.2 Stephen P. Sobotka, "Projections of Flight Personnel Employment, 1960,"
Journal of Air Law and Commerce, Vol. 25, Winter, 1958.
3 Sobotka, et al., Prices of Used Commercial Aircraft, 1959-65, The Transpor-
tation Center at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois, February, 1959.(multilithed manuscript)
4 The price forecast study referred to above, which predicted prices of piston
aircraft in use in the entire non-Communist world, estimated the future composi-
tion and size of the total "free world" fleet for the 1959-65 period.
5 The approximate comparisons are:
Block Speed at First Class Hourly Seat
Aircraft 1500 miles Range Seats Mile Capacity
DC-7 290 m.p.h. 60 17,400
B-707/120 450 m.p.h. 108 48,600
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The less dramatic technological advances of the preceding decade (1948-
1958) in aviation history produced a quadrupling of air passenger traffic
while approximately doubling the number of flight personnel employed, 6
with average output per flight crewman going from .93 to 1.86 million
revenue passenger miles annually between 1948 and 1958.
Two factors determine the levels of flight personnel employment. They
are: (1) the nunber of aircraft hours flown annually, and (2) the number
of flight personnel used in conjunction with the provision of aircraft serv-
ices. The latter in turn depends on the number of flight crew used in the
cockpits of aircraft and the number of hours per year which flight crews
are utilized in revenue-producing service. The derivation of estimates for
1961 and 1965 of both of these factors, which result in an estimate of flight
crew employment, are described below.
A. Estimate of the Total Aircraft Hours to Be Flown
Since the estimates and analysis used in deriving this forecast were
described in detail in the previously cited study which yielded forecasts of
used aircraft prices, only a brief statement of the method used will be given
here. This statement is only indicative of the method and does not purport
to be a complete explanation.
A "linear programming" model was devised in which aircraft from the
total supply in the fleets of U.S. operators were assigned in accordance with
their relative advantages to various stage lengths so that the total costs of
operating the airline system were minimized. 7 Aircraft are, in this model,
used at approximately current load factors, and as many aircraft are "used"
as are necessary to fulfill the demands of the market for passenger miles.
Three sets of inputs are employed in the use of this model: (1) The
market for aircraft services, i.e., the revenue passenger miles expected to be
demanded in each of a number of markets (defined 'by length of stage), e.g.,
0-200 miles, 200-400 miles, etc. (2) Total available capacity of each type
aircraft expressed in terms of number of aircraft, seating capacity, load
factor, speed, and aircraft utilization. (3) Direct operating costs for each
aircraft type.
1. The Air Travel Market. The air travel market is not a homogeneous
one. The cost of providing air service varies significantly for trips of differ-
ent lengths. The aggregate travel market forecast in passenger miles is
therefore divided into nine segments ranging in stage length from 0-200
miles to 2500 miles and over.8 Table 1 shows the aggregate market in billions
of revenue passenger miles, forecast for 1961 and 1965, distributed over
the nine stage lengths.
Because the forecast of revenue passenger miles flown is not distin-
guished by length of haul, the distribution of the market used in this study
is based on a projection of the trend of seat mile distributions over the
period 1947 to 1958, obtained in the following manner: Distributions by
6 Rev. Passenger Miles Employment (Dec. 31)
Flown (million) Pilots and Copilots Other Flight Personnel
1948 7,870.0 6,926 1,515
1958 31,335.7 12,897 3,667
7 To approximate reality more closely, some aircraft types are, in this pro-
cedure, forced to fly routes over which they have relative disadvantages. This
approximates the situation which prevails in the real world.
8 The market portion of the model inputs is based on the C.A.A. forecast of
air passenger travel in U.S. domestic and international operations. 1960-1965-1970
Civil Aviation and Federal Airways Forecasts, Civil Aeronautics Administration(December, 1956).
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stage length were obtained from analyses of U.S. domestic and international
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percentage of seat miles flown in each of the market segments for the
above-mentioned years as well as the projected trend of these distributions.
It may be seen that the 400-1,000 mile range maintained about the same
share (approximately 30%) of total hours flown, while the long stages, 1,000
miles and over, expanded from about 22% in 1947 to nearly 40% in 1958.
The percentage of aircraft capacity flown in short stage lengths meanwhile
decreased by almost the same amount. Projecting these tendencies into the
future period implies that the influences establishing the stage length
patterns in the 1947-58 period will continue and, specifically, that techno-
logical developments facilitating extensive expansion of the short-haul
market (0-400 miles) would not occur prior to the end of the forecast period.
TABLE 1
AIR PASSENGER MARKET, 1961 AND 1965,
DISTRIBUTED BY LENGTH OF STAGE











Over 2500 3.5 5.1
Total 46.6 61.0
Source: Estimate based on CAA forecast cited in text.
Once the distribution of seat miles, i.e., of capacity flown, is derived in
order to arrive at an appropriate distribution of revenue passenger miles
by length of stage, an adjustment is made for the historically different
ratios of revenue passenger miles to seat miles (load factors) in the various
stage lengths. Thus, a new percentage distribution is obtained by weighting
the seat mile distribution by the load factors pertinent to the several stage
lengths.9 Applying this percentage distribution to the estimate of the aggre-
gate market results in the distribution of passenger miles expected to be
flown in each of the nine stage lengths which is shown in Table 1.
2. Aircraft Capacity. The capacity, expressed in seat-hours, of each type
of aircraft depends on the number of aircraft of that type, the average seat-
ing capacity, and the rate of utilization (hours flown per day or per year).
The aircraft capacity figures for 1961 are shown in Table 2. Seating and
utilization estimates are based on current and historical airline practice.
The composition-in type and number--of aircraft in the fleet includes the
present airline fleet and aircraft firmly ordered and scheduled for delivery
9 Load factors used are: Length of Stage Load Factor
0-200 55%
200-2000 60
2000 and over 63
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by 1961.10 For 1965 an estimate was made of additional orders expected to
be placed for delivery before 1965.11
The rate at which available seat hours are used up in providing a unit
of demand, which with a given market determines the number of aircraft
hours that will be flown, varies with the length of haul served because of
different speeds and different passenger loads (load factors) for different
lengths of aircraft trip. Thus, a passenger mile produced over a long stage
length, by virtue of the greater average speed and (historically) larger load
factors achieved, uses up less seat hour capacity than a passenger mile
produced by the same aircraft on a short-stage length. The use-up rate
(seat hours per passenger mile) equals 1/speed x load factor for each stage
in the range of a particular aircraft. The speeds and load factors used
appear in Table 3.
TABLE 2
ESTIMATED SEAT HOUR CAPACITY BY TYPE AIRCRAFT, 1961
Average
Daily
Number of Average Utilizationt Annual Seat


























































Source: * Airline Fleet Record
t "Prices of Used Commercial Aircraft, 1961-1965," Transportation
Center Research Report, pp. 77, 78, 81.
10 Expected attrition is deducted. Caravelle orders are not included.
11 This estimate was based on the linear programming model's valuation of
the various aircraft. For each type the model yields a "rent" earned per unit of
output. If the present value of these rents over the expected life of the aircraft
exceeded the current purchase price, a number of such aircraft were added to the
fleet.
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TABLE 3
AIRCRAFT BLOCK SPEEDS AND LOAD FACTORS
(In Statute Miles)
Stage Length 100 200 300 400 500
(Statute Miles)
Load Factor in % 53 60 60 60 60
Aircraft
DC-3 126 144 151 155 158
CV-240 137 164 175 181 185
M-202A, 404 139 161 171 176 179
CV-340, 440 136 167 181 189 194
F-27 144 178 188
V-700 163 201 217 227 233
V-810 168 232 251
Stage Length 300 500 1000 1500 2000
or more
Load Factor in % 60 60 60 63 63
Aircraft
DC-4 168 181 191 195 197
L-049 185 207 227 235 239
DC-6 193 218 243 252 257
DC-6B 201 223 243 250 254
L-749 188 212 235 244 249
L-1049 188 211 233 241 245
DC-7, 7B 216 248 279 291 297
L-1049G, H 210 236 261 270 275
DC-7C 211 243 274 286 292
B-377 184 203 220 227 230
L-1649 211 243 274 286 292
V-810 232 251 267
L-188 244 282 318 333
B-720/CV-880 Type 300 365 433 462 478
B-707/DC-8(J-57) 288 351 420 450 466
B-707/DC-8(J-75) 288 352 423 454 471
Source: Load factor estimates based on 1957 load factors associated with
the respective stage lengths.
Block speeds for piston and V-700 aircraft are computed from air-
line schedules; for newer aircraft speeds were based on manufac-
turers' estimates, adjusted for difference between scheduled and
engineering speeds.
3. Direct Operating Costs. It is the cost differentials that determine
the optimal allocation of the fleet, according to the cost-minimizing criterion.
Costs of crew, maintenance, fuel and oil, insurance costs, and landing fees
are included. 12 The component costs are based on airline experience of hourly
costs for each piston aircraft type, on manufacturers' estimates for aircraft
12 Costs, such as administrative, ticketing, baggage handling, which do not
vary with aircraft type are excluded as are capital costs which are regarded as
"sunk" costs. Neither of these costs will affect a decision as to operating one type
of available aircraft or another on a certain route.
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not in operation or newly-introduced into service. These hourly cost figures
are divided by the number of miles and the number of passengers which
can be flown by a particular aircraft in each stage length segment within its
range, yielding a cost per passenger mile to correspond with the market unit.
Table 4 shows the number of hours to be flown by each type aircraft in
the 1961 and 1965 fleets, selected according to the criterion of the model-
to satisfy the specified demand with the least-cost fleet available. The air-
craft are grouped to distinguish the three kinds of crew requirements
expected to prevail for aircraft of different characteristics.
TABLE 4
ESTIMATE OF HOURS To BE FLOWN (In Thousands) 1961, 1965
(Aircraft Grouped According to Probable Cockpit Crew)
Aircraft Type 1961 1965
2-man crew 2148.5 2687.3
3-man crew 1524.8 959.1
3 or 4-man crew 937.2 1536.7
Total 4610.5 5183.1
B. Number of Flight Personnel
Total employment of airline flight crew personnel required to provide
a given number of aircraft hours is a function both of the number of men
used to fly a plane and the average number of hours worked per man.
The crew requirements for flying an aircraft vary both with the type of
equipment and, at least in the case of the large "jets," with the operating
airline. The basic crew requirements, stated in the Civil Air Regulations,
call for a minimum of two pilots in the cockpit of an aircraft of less than
80,000 lbs. gross weight, and two pilots and a flight engineer, who may or
may not be pilot qualified, in planes of 80,000 lbs. or over. Several airlines
have agreed in recent contract agreements to carry an additional man, i.e.,
a third pilot, on the large so-called pure jets. 13
Since not all airlines have signed contracts covering turbine-powered
equipment and existing contracts will be renewed or renegotiated at least
one time before 1965, it is impossible to predict what the final size of the
cockpit crew will be on jet aircraft. Therefore, two alternative employment
estimates are made in this study. One on the assumption that all large jets
will be flown with a 3-man crew, and another assuming a flight crew of
four men. The aircraft of less than 80,000 lbs. are expected to continue to
fly with two men, the larger aircraft other than the "large jet" types with a
crew of three. Table 4 groups the various aircraft predicted to be in use in
1961 and 1965 into three classes on the basis of these different manning
expectations and shows the number of aircraft hours to be flown by each;
table 5 presents the estimated range of flight crew hours required under
the alternative manning assumptions. The total number of flight crew hours
required to furnish the indicated total of aircraft time in the air will be
between approximately 12.8 and 14.4 million in 1965, depending on whether
most airlines will use a three or a four-man cockpit crew.
13 American, Eastern, TWA.
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TABLE 5
ESTIMATE OF FLIGHT CREW HOURS (000) 1961, 1965
Aircraft Type 1961 1965
2-man crew 4297.0 5374.6
3-man crew 4574.4 2877.3
4-man crew 2811.6-3748.8 4610.1-6146.8
Total 11683.0-12620.2 12862.0-14398.7
As indicated at the 'beginning of this section, the total number of hours
of flying time must vary also with the average hours worked per man. While
both pilots and flight engineers in U.S. airlines are allowed to work a
maximum of 85 flight hours per month (1000 per year) the actual hours
worked, for a variety of reasons, falls far short of this. A certain amount
of ground time is credited as flight time, scheduling does not permit maxi-
mum utilization of pilots, reserve pilots spend a good deal of time "standing
by," etc. In 1958 the average block-to-block aircraft hours per pilot or
copilot on scheduled airline payrolls was 744; in 1956 it was 801 and in
1957, 800 hours. 14
It is of course quite possible that pilot annual service hours will over
the period of this forecast vary significantly. Since prediction of any such
changes is not feasible, the status quo has been adopted here in converting
pilot hours to numbers of men. The weighted average of the "block" hours
worked by the pilot-copilot combination over the years 1956-1958 is 781 per
annum. It is impossible to distinguish hours worked for pilots or copilots
separately because of the manner in which this information is reported.
Flight engineer hours worked are equally impossible to isolate. Due to
these limitations in the data it is here assumed that pilots, copilots and
flight engineers work on the average the same number of block hours per
year.
Thus, dividing the total flight crew hours shown in Table 5 by 781 will
yield the number of men expected to be employed in the several categories
of aircraft types which we have classified according to the size or kind of
flight crew they may employ. These employment figures appear in Table 6.
As may be seen in this table, total flight personnel employment in 1961 is
predicted to fall somewhere between about 15,000 and 16,200; in 1965
between about 16,500 and 18,500.
The implied comparison in Table 6 between the estimated future and
the 1958 actual employment should be regarded with some caution. While
it is true that a considerable slowing in growth of aircrew employment is
suggested by the findings of this paper, the exact rate of this change is not
measured by comparing these two figures. First of all, the category "other
flight personnel" included in the 1958 total employment figure includes at
least some members who are not flight engineers and are therefore subject
to different conditions than those treated here. 15 In order to provide a
14 Ratio of total block hours (11% of aircraft on-off hours) flown to one half
the average number of pilots and copilots on the payroll for the year. Block hours
include some ground time, e.g. taxi time; flight hours are "wheels-off" to "wheels-
on" time.
15 For instance, the ratio of aircraft hours flown to number of "other flight
personnel" is substantially higher than to the number of pilots and copilots, which
we used to derive the estimate of all flight personnel, including flight engineers.
It is higher, in fact, than the legal limit of flying hours for flight engineers. The
true hours for engineers are not obtainable.
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slightly less precarious comparison between current and predicted future
employment a projection has been made of pilot and copilot employment
only. The results of this calculation are shown in Table 7.
Table 7 presents actual employment of pilots in 1958 and an estimated
range of pilot employment for each of the years 1961 and 1965. The lower
limit of this range represents the situation where the crew of all large
aircraft (over 80,000 lbs. gross weight) would consist of two pilots and a
non-pilot flight engineer. The supposition leading to the upper limit estimate
is one of a cockpit crew of three pilot-qualified men on all such aircraft.
Depending on the manning decisions made during this period, therefore,
pilot employment between 1958 and 1965 is predicted to grow from just
under 13,000 men to between about 13,300 to 16,500.
TABLE 6
ESTIMATE OF FLIGHT CREW EMPLOYMENT, BY SIZE AIRCRAFT 1961, 1965
1958
Aircraft Type 1961 1965 (Actual)*
2-man crew (a/c under
80,000 lbs. gross
weight) 5502 6882
3-man crew (a/c over
80,000 lbs. gross
wt. other than
large jets) 5857 3684
3 or 4-man crew (large jets) 3600 to 5903 to
4800 7870
Total 14959 to 16469 to 16,564
16159 18436
Source: FAA Statistical Handbook of Aviation, 1959 Edition; includes
12,897 "pilots and copilots" and 3,667 "other flight personnel."
TABLE 7
ESTIMATE OF PILOT AND COPILOT EMPLOYMENT
1958
Aircraft Type 1961 1965 (Actual)
2-man crew 5502 6882
3-man crew* 3905 2456
3 or 4-man crewt 2400-3600 3935-5903
Total 11807-13007 13273-15241 12897
Includes two pilots.
t Includes two or three pilots (plus one flight engineer not included in
figures).
Both the pilot employment and the total flight crew employment esti-
mates, as suggested earlier should be regarded with some caution, not only
for the reasons of imperfect comparability of the actual and estimated
figures discussed in the previous paragraph. Some of the sources and even
direction of possible error we can identify and evaluate.
First, it should be emphasized that this is not a forecast of total airline
flight crew employment, i.e., certain portions of the market for airline serv-
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ices are not considered in this study. It is limited to the passenger operations
of the scheduled domestic and international carriers, excludes therefore that
portion of the scheduled airlines cargo traffic which is not carried in the
cargo holds of passenger planes on passenger flights. All-cargo, supple-
mental and non-certificated carriers are also not included in this forecast.
Within the scope set for the study, several possible sources of bias should
be mentioned. It may be that the assumption of cost-minimization for the
entire airline system in allocating aircraft to different markets (and thereby
determining the total number of hours flown) tends to influence the employ-
ment estimate slightly downwards. A number of contingencies, which in
actual operation would act to prevent such a perfect allocation, were allowed
for in constructing the model. The likely bias is considered to be very small
if at all present. Not taken explicitly into account in the derivation of these
estimates is the cockpit manning practice on long international flights,
where double crew or reserve men are frequently carried.16 As, with increas-
ing use of faster equipment, the time required to complete long trips falls
within the 8-hour tour of duty limit for flight crew, somewhat fewer men
may be used in serving such routes.
Finally, these estimates are subject to the errors of possibly misleading
assumptions. Fewer monthly hours flown per man per month would, other
things equal, result in larger employment of flight personnel; a proportion-
ately faster growth of the short-haul market (within the same aggregate
demand estimate) may tend to change the employment figure for total
flight crew;17 a greater overall expansion in air travel demand than that
assumed would increase the employment estimate, but less than proportion-
ately because of the trend toward the use of more "productive" aircraft
which would tend to raise the average number of seat miles produced per
man per year.
16 The derivation of the figure on the average number of service block-to-block
hours includes both regular size and "oversize" crews in international service.
Unless the frequency with which oversize crews are employed relative to the use
of regular crews changes in the future, no bias is introduced by this omission.
17 The net effect is difficult to forecast. In the short haul market smaller air-
craft are used. They require only two pilots (with or wi-thout a flight engineer
depending on aircraft size). On the other hand, the aircraft tend to be slower(block-to-block) and, because of this small size the seat mile output per "pilot hour"
is lower than in long haul service. On net it is likely that an increase in the relative
size of the short haul market, with a given total market, will increase the demand
for pilots but the effect on the total crew is indeterminate.
